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ABSTRACT 
 
Independent venture capital (IVC) firms invest in nascent, high growth, high risk, and market 
scalable companies for the purposes of achieving a successful exit.  An exit is the primary method 
IVCs use to receive a return on investment.  Although IVCs provide capital funding, strategic 
advice, and access to an extensive network of potential suppliers and customers, approximately 
20% of portfolio firms reach a successful exit.   
 
This paper outlines the job of the IVC, the due diligence and staging processes, and addresses 
four factors that might account for the low successful exit rate:  1) diseconomy of scale in the 
venture capital industry, 2) emphasis on quick exits rather than building long-term sustainable 
companies, 3) exits that are independent of fund inflows, and 4) financial and market forecasts 
that appear to trump market conditions.  This paper addresses a gap in literature by providing 
four factors contributing to low IVC success exit rates.  To achieve higher exit successes, IVCs 
need to cease providing funding capital, especially during times of high capital inflows, and stop 
chasing portfolio firms that have little chance of achieving a successful exit.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ndependent venture capitalists (IVCs) invest in new, high growth, high risk, and market scalable 
companies known as portfolio firms.  IVCs stimulate innovation, job creation, technology 
improvements, enhancement of international competitiveness, and economic growth (Li & Zahra, 
2012).  In addition, IVC firms fill a critical intermediary function by not only providing equity funding to portfolio 
firms, but creating value for high net worth investors (Jackson, Bates, & Bradford, 2012; Olsson, Frydenberg, 
Jakobsen, & Jessen, 2010; Schertler & Tykvova, 2011).  Zhang, Aksu, and Wang (2012) found that IVC firms play a 
critical role in positively shaping new firms. 
 
The proportion of companies receiving IVC funding is very low and is not a primary source of capital for 
most businesses in the United States (Rajan, 2010).  IVC firms receive thousands of requests for funding per year 
(Cumming, Schmidt, & Walz, 2010).  Portfolio firms receiving IVC funding account for one-sixth of 1% of all new 
businesses per year, that obtain capital funding (Kaplan & Lerner, 2010).  Although IVCs screen, conduct due 
diligence, provide funds in stages, offer strategic advice, and make available valuable network contacts, 
approximately 20% of portfolio companies who were among the one-sixth of 1% receiving IVC funding survive to a 
successful exit (Kaplan & Lerner, 2010 & Strömsten & Waluszewski, 2012).   
 
A successful exit occurs when the IVC realizes a return on investment (ROI) by selling an interest in the 
portfolio company by an initial public offering (IPO), by having the portfolio firm acquired by another company, 
sold to another company, or merged with another organization (Strömsten & Waluszewski, 2012).  IVCs’ portfolio 
successful exits are calculated as the ratio of successful venture investments over the total number of portfolio firms 
invested (Bartkus et al., 2013).  At the time when the IVC considers liquidating interest in the portfolio firm, the 
portfolio firm is usually in its youthful stage of the business lifecycle.  A portfolio company is typically “sold” after 
experiencing a degree of financial and market success (Bamford & Douthett, 2013).    
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The focus of this paper is to explore the factors contributing to why after extensive screening, stringent due 
diligence processes, staged funding, and providing strategic advice and access to established business networks, IVC 
successful exits are at approximately 20%.  The literature review outlines the job of the IVC, the due diligence and 
staging processes, and four factors contributing to low IVC success rates.  The discussion begins with the job of the 
IVC. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The Job Of The Independent Venture Capitalist  
 
Most IVCs come to venture capital from technology-based industries as executives and as start-up 
entrepreneurs.  IVCs also come from prestigious business programs at selected universities in California, 
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania with a specialization in financial management.  As part of the job, IVCs do not just 
provide funding; they provide managerial services, monitoring of the portfolio company, offer strategic advice, and 
access to an extensive network of potential customers and suppliers (Bhagat, 2013).  IVCs fund ventures at different 
stages as long as uncertainties do not make further funding risk assessments prohibitive.  Receiving thousands of 
business plans yearly, IVCs scrutinize most business plans, meet with entrepreneurial teams, valuate the new 
business, discern market scalability, and determine whether the product or service meets an everyday need (Blum, 
2013). 
 
The job of a venture capitalist is broad based.  IVCs seek to generate a stream of positive cash flow and to 
create value while skillfully evaluating funding opportunities.  After all relevant evaluations and due diligence 
process have been completed, the IVC must decide whether to invest in the portfolio company.  Once the portfolio 
company meets IVCs funding requirements, the IVC negotiates the terms of the investment relationship based on 
portfolio valuation methods, usually in terms of multiples or comparables.  The IVC monitors the portfolio firm by 
serving on the board of directors.  To achieve a successful exit, IVCs seek to liquidate investments based on 
valuations and rate of return.  IVCs collaborate with investment banks and market movers to facilitate an IPO, 
merger, acquisition, or sell. 
 
Raising funds is a time-consuming and difficult endeavor for the IVC.  They raise funds from pension 
funds, insurance companies, foundations, institutional investors, and high net worth persons (NVCA, 2014).  
Individuals who invest in venture capital funds are limited partners (NVCA, 2014).  IVCs who manage funds are 
general partners and have a fiduciary responsibility to the limited partners (NVCA, 2014).     
 
Factoring for the growth of the economy and the stock market, Rajan (2010) and Jackson et al. (2012) 
inferred the availability of IVC funding sources has increased steadily over past years, although IVC investing in 
early stage companies has a lower likelihood of reaching an exit (Bartkus, Hassan, & Ngene, 2013). 
  
Due Diligence 
 
After the initial screening but before the IVC decides to invest in the portfolio firm, the IVC performs due 
diligence.  During this process, IVCs focus on reducing investment risk.  Before making a financial investment, 
IVCs perform extensive research on the portfolio firm’s products, management team, and internal and external 
competitive environments.  Due diligence is measured by the total hours an IVC spends performing research on a 
preportfolio company (Blum, 2014).  IVCs perform due diligence to reduce uncertainty in early stage investments.   
 
As part of the due diligence process, IVCs review: 
 
 Pending legal action 
 Provisional and approved patents 
 Market trends, potential, and strategy 
 Whether the product or service meets an everyday need 
 The competitive environment 
 Whether the company has a scalable technology 
 The portfolio firm’s competitive advantage (Wiltbank, Read, Dew, & Sarasvathy, 2009) 
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The effort spent by IVCs performing due diligence is generally proportionate to the anticipated investment 
funding size (Wiltbank et al., 2009).  From screening to seed or early funding, the due diligence process takes 
approximately three to six months (Lehtonen & Lahti, 2009; Yung, 2009).  IVCs who conduct extensive due 
diligence and are more involved in the post investment operations of the portfolio firm experience significantly 
higher ROI through a successful exit (Wiltbank et al., 2009).  
 
The most significant aspect of due diligence is the use of comparables from online venture capital 
databases to determine valuation price and evaluate similar portfolio firms before deciding to invest.  Based on 
comparables, IVCs use multiples ranging from 3x to 10x based on revenue and sometimes earnings before interest, 
taxes, and amortization within three to five years of funding (Blum, 2014).  For example, if an IVC invests $10 
million dollars in a start-up, the IVC expects a minimum return of $30 million in three to five years.  IVCs also 
consult with market experts to understand market trends and requirements (Blum, 2014).     
 
Qualitative factors enter into the due diligence process.  IVCs consider “gut feelings” related to investing in 
the portfolio firm, usually based on the relationship with management (Blum, 2014).  IVCs seek good personal 
chemistry with the portfolio management team.  IVCs should have confidence in the portfolio firm’s management’s 
ability to understand industry standards and demands.  IVCs use qualitative and quantitative factors to determine 
how much time (three to five years) and money ($10 million, $50 million, $100 million) are needed to achieve a 
successful exit and required return on investment (Blum, 2014). 
 
Staging Process 
 
After a successful due diligence process, the IVC will consider funding the portfolio company in stages.  
Most IVCs invest in software services, social and Internet media, cleantech, wireless communications, medical, 
health, and life science technologies companies located primarily in California and Massachusetts (NVCA, 2014).  
Differences exist during the staging process and across industry sectors (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).    
 
The funding stages are: 
 
Seed Stage: The portfolio company has a concept, prototype, or product under development but is normally not 
operational.  The company has been in business less than 18 months (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).  A business plan might 
exist and or the company might be a concept on a napkin (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).  
 
Early Stage: The portfolio company has a product or service in testing, in pilot production, or it might be 
commercially available (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).  The company could be generating revenues and is usually in 
business for less than three years (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).  
 
Expansion Stage: Product(s) or service(s) are in production (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).  The company exhibits revenue 
growth and might be starting to be profitable (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).  The company is usually in business more than 
three years (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).  
 
Late Stage: The company’s product(s) or service(s) are commercially available (Ecer & Khalid, 2013), and the 
company is generating sustained revenues and usually has a positive cash flow (Ecer & Khalid, 2013).  The 
company is likely profitable.  In the late stage, the company might include separate and distinct operating divisions 
(Ecer & Khalid, 2013) and in the late stage, they might be ready to be acquired, sold, merged, and exited by the IVC 
via an IPO. 
 
Staging is a common practice and an important activity to mitigate IVC risk by limiting financial exposure 
in subsequent rounds, reducing the effects of asymmetry of information and abandoning further funding if low 
return on investment is forecasted (Dahiya & Ray, 2012; Geronikolaou & Papachristou, 2011; Hsu, 2010; Smolarski 
& Kut, 2011).  Reducing economic uncertainties is a factor in staged financing influencing IVC decision-making (Li 
& Mahoney, 2011).  The IVC firm faces the maximum risk in the staging process during the seed round (Smolarski 
& Kut, 2011).  By staging, the IVC firm invests capital and provides additional value-added services, such as 
strategic advice and access to established IVC networks, to the portfolio firm (Smolarski & Kut, 2011).  Staged 
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financing helps the IVC to define goals, monitor the progress of the portfolio firm, and provides the IVC with the 
option to abandon, delay, or invest funds in the portfolio company (Driouchi, Leseure, & Bennett, 2009; Rajan, 
2010; Smolarski & Kut, 2011).  
 
Four Factors Contributing To 20% Success Rate 
 
After conducting an in-depth due diligence process and staged funding, approximately 80% of portfolio 
firms will not provide a return on investment to IVCs.  Four factors have been identified for the low IVC successful 
exit rate.  One factor is diseconomy of scale.  Cumming and Dai (2011) suggested a diseconomy of scale exists in 
the venture capital industry partially because of limitations of IVCs human capital as the fund size grows.  IVCs 
tend to overextend by investing in too many portfolio firms following periods where fund inflows are increasing.  
IVCs often opt to invest in newer portfolio firms rather than investing more funds in existing portfolio firms  
(Bartkus et al., 2013).   
 
The second factor is an emphasis on quick exits rather than building long-term sustainable companies.  
Because most IVC funds last approximately 10 years, IVCs want to turn funds over two or three times during the 
life of the fund to satisfy investors and to build a positive reputation within the venture capital industry.  Bringing a 
portfolio company to an earlier-than-expected exit permits the IVC to raise more funding (Bartkus et al., 2013).  
Most IVCs focus on funding portfolio companies for two to five years or less and then hope to exit with high ROI.  
The emphasis of quick exists reduces the IVCs’ focus on building market leading, high brand aware, and sustainable 
businesses benefiting economic activity.   
 
The third factor is that a successful exit is independent of fund inflows.  IVCs tend to invest in more 
portfolio firms after increased fundraising (Bartkus et al., 2013).  When fundraising increases, IVCs tend to offer 
higher valuations and provide more capital, irrespective of portfolio company-estimated value (Bartkus et al., 2013).  
During times of enhanced fundraising, IVCs are more likely to invest in portfolio firms with a low probability of 
achieving a successful exit. 
 
The fourth factor is that the IVC’s association with a portfolio firm might be prearranged by financial and 
market forecasts concerning the type of exit (Gerasymenko & Arthurs, 2014).  Without understanding how the IVCs 
involvement in the portfolio company correlates with exit forecasts, the relationship between the IVCs value-added 
services and the portfolio company remains imperfect (Gerasymenko & Arthurs, 2014).  IVCs might exit not 
because of market conditions, but rather due to financial and market forecasts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The reason IVCs have low success rates in turning portfolio firms into successful exits might not lie in the 
inherent nature of venture capital, conducting due diligence, or the staging process.  Similar to demand-pull 
inflation, the demand for funding portfolio companies and the availability of funding from institutional and high net 
worth investors outpaces the supply of quality portfolio firms that can achieve a successful exist and return a high 
ROI.  The reasons for poor exit rates are a result of a mix of diseconomy of scale in the venture capital industry, 
emphasis on quick exits rather than building companies, exits independent of fund inflows, and financial and market 
forecasts that appear to trump market conditions.  If IVCs want higher exit rates, IVCs need to cease providing 
funding, especially during times of high capital inflows, and stop playing a numbers game by chasing portfolio firms 
that have little chance of achieving a successful exit.    
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